Intelligence reports reveal that terror handlers in Jammu and Kashmir are shifting tactics to use pornography websites and encrypted apps for communication. This strategy helps them disguise instructions as casual internet traffic, allowing them to bypass digital monitoring efforts by security agencies.
Security agencies monitoring militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir have identified a significant change in how terror handlers communicate. As surveillance measures have become more effective on mainstream platforms like WhatsApp and Signal, handlers have moved toward obscure and non-conventional digital channels to transmit instructions.
Investigators report that these groups are increasingly utilizing pornography websites that feature live-chat functions. By conducting communication within these high-traffic environments, handlers can mask illicit instructions as casual or non-political social interactions. This approach allows them to hide in plain sight, blending their activities with the high volume of traffic on such platforms, which complicates the ability of security grids to isolate and flag suspicious data.
Beyond utilizing high-traffic websites, the communication infrastructure has shifted to tools that offer enhanced privacy. Intelligence assessments indicate a move toward the Tor network, which anonymizes data by relaying it through various global points, making it difficult to trace the source of the information. Additionally, handlers are using niche messaging applications such as Conion and Coatex. These applications are favored because they often do not require traditional user registration steps like linking a phone number, email address, or SIM card. These apps are also designed to run on low-bandwidth networks, such as 2G, ensuring that handlers can maintain connections even in remote regions with limited internet infrastructure.
Another recurring challenge for security forces is the use of foreign-generated virtual SIM cards. These tools allow for the creation of phone numbers that are not linked to physical identities, leaving almost no digital footprint. Security agencies have noted this as a persistent hurdle, as it allows handlers to create disposable communication channels that are difficult to track. This method was previously identified in investigations into the 2019 Pulwama attack, where multiple virtual SIMs were used to coordinate activities.
These evolving tactics reflect an ongoing effort by militant organizations to stay ahead of digital interception capabilities. For security agencies, the priority is now to recalibrate surveillance techniques to account for these off-grid, encrypted channels. Intelligence units are working to upgrade their digital monitoring tools to better identify and intercept communication patterns that no longer rely on standard, identifiable internet traffic.